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Faced with unilateral
U.S. military intervention, a coalition of secondary powers—including both
traditional rivals and allies—publicly questions the United States’ use of its
unequaled might. Turning to international organizations and law, bilateral di-
plomacy, coalition building, and public rhetoric, though never to overt mili-
tary alliances, these countries seek to constrain the ability of the United States
to deploy military force, following a pattern that has been referred to as “soft
balancing.” Variations of this story are present in the literature; most describe
global responses to the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the debate on
soft balancing largely has been conªned to the post–Cold War world. A similar
description is apt, however, for a previous era, too. Starting with the Spanish-
American War of 1898, the United States launched frequent interventions in
Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.1 This earlier era of unbridled,
unilateral U.S. interventionism also drew important responses that represent a
valuable case offering new insights into the nature and effects of soft balancing.
Robert Pape’s inºuential argument on “soft balancing” holds that weaker
states confronting a unipolar power may leverage “nonmilitary tools, such as
international institutions, economic statecraft, and strict interpretations of neu-
trality,” to constrain the superpower.2 In an age of U.S. unipolarity, Pape’s con-
cept gave a name to the strategies of states seeking to curtail U.S. power. It
made an immediate splash in international relations scholarship and policy
debates by updating balance of power theory. Growing out of the international
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responses to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the debate around soft balancing
has focused almost exclusively on very recent history, particularly responses to
the perceived unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration. The concept
has been applied to other situations, too, including the foreign policies of
Brazil, India, and South Africa;3 Southeast Asian institutionalism;4 and U.S.-
European relations.5 With few exceptions, these cases are set in the last two
decades. The temporally narrow scope of the evidence employed in the de-
bate on soft balancing has limited efforts to reªne the concept, to understand
the mechanisms through which soft balancing may occur, and especially to
judge its possible consequences.
The importance of expanding scholars’ and policymakers’ understanding of
soft balancing is theoretical, empirical, and practical. Theoretically, this article
demonstrates that soft balancing has applications beyond the events for which
the concept was developed. Although the term has been limited to situations
of global unipolarity, we demonstrate that it can be applied to at least some in-
stances of regional unipolarity. The article expands the empirical base for soft
balancing into a period in which both private diplomatic and public state-
ments are available as evidence; in doing so, it also advances the understand-
ing of Latin American agency in U.S.–Latin American relations. This evidence
demonstrates that soft balancing is statecraft, not just rhetoric for public con-
sumption. Finally, soft balancing has largely been seen as a threat to the United
States. This article shows this need not be the case. In fact, the soft balancing
examined here led the United States to adjust its policies in the Western
Hemisphere toward an approach with less overt intervention, which produced
great beneªts at considerably lower costs. Soft balancing need not be feared.
This article argues that more than a century before the French, Germans, and
Russians combined at the United Nations to oppose the U.S. invasion of Iraq,
Latin Americans sought to develop new international norms against military
intervention in a strategy that closely resembles descriptions of more recent
soft balancing. In response to heightened U.S. interventionism, which was
demonstrated in practice and declared in doctrine, Argentina and Mexico led
an effort that contributed to a tidal shift in U.S. policy on military intervention
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lasting from the 1930s into the 1950s and arguably thereafter. These Latin
American responses would seem to present an ideal case for examining a prec-
edent for soft balancing long before the term was coined. The period offers a
strong comparative case that is independent from those studied in the more re-
cent debate about soft balancing. Scholarly discussion of soft balancing has
implicitly assumed that because the post–Cold War era is the only modern uni-
polar system, there are no other relevant cases to examine. We see such an ex-
ample, however, in U.S. relations with Latin America in the early twentieth
century. The degree of power asymmetry between the United States and its
southern neighbors at this time was so great that the Western Hemisphere was
effectively a unipolar system. This provides an invaluable case to add histori-
cal depth to examining the concept of soft balancing, which otherwise must re-
main conªned to the very recent period in which unipolarity characterized the
entire globe. (Treating a portion of the world as a system in its own right is not
unusual, for example, in studies of the European balance of power.)
Although U.S. actions during this period have received extensive study,
Latin American reactions have received much less attention. To the de-
gree Latin American actions have been considered, they have most often been
assumed to fall under U.S. hegemony or to constitute bandwagoning. During
the pre–World War II period, Latin American states displayed a variety of re-
sponses to the growth in U.S. power and unilateralism, including trying to
constrain its exercise. This ªnding can contribute to the body of work on Latin
American agency that disputes scholarship wedded to a version of depend-
ency theory in which U.S. hegemony is absolute,6 and it updates accounts
that argue that balancing behavior has not been relevant to inter-American
relations.7 It also questions international relations approaches that conform
to what David Mares has characterized as an oversimpliªed view of Latin
American foreign policy autonomy, in which “the constraints posed by the
United States are perceived to be so overwhelming that Latin American coun-
tries are assumed incapable of formulating their own security deªnitions.”8
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This article contributes to the debate on soft balancing in three main ways.
The soft balancing debate, like that of balance of power generally, has been
dominated by realism. The strategies of soft balancing, however, draw heavily
on institutions, international law, and the promotion of norms that constrain
the unipole’s exercise of power. It is also invokes questions of “threat,” not just
material power, and the perception both of a unipole’s role and intentions. The
article seeks to reªne the concept of soft balancing, both through additional
empirical application and through more explicit dialogue with institutional-
ist and constructivist theories, and to more clearly delineate the interactive
processes of soft balancing. From a methodological perspective, the concept of
soft balancing has been applied almost exclusively to the circumstances that
gave birth to it. To demonstrate that a concept is worth its salt, it is impor-
tant to show that it illuminates events and processes separate from the ones
it was coined to describe. In a ªnal, related point, the article makes impor-
tant empirical contributions to the soft-balancing literature. As Stephen
Brooks and William Wohlforth noted, the presentism of the soft-balancing de-
bate has meant that it draws on a limited range of sources—largely public
pronouncements—which might be less reliable than private information.9 The
reliance on contemporary cases also means that the process of soft balancing
was still ongoing and its outcomes were unclear. Examining a historical exam-
ple, using multinational archival sources, can help scholars and policymakers
understand where soft balancing may lead. In contrast to much of the debate,
we conclude that soft balancing need not be feared. It will not always lead to
hard balancing and greater conºict; in fact, an evolution of great power poli-
cies to account for soft balancers’ interests could induce more cooperation and
mutual beneªt.
The article summarizes the debate over soft balancing, before suggesting
further developments to this concept that more explicitly connect the con-
cept to liberal and constructivist international relations theory. While it makes
sense to limit the concept to unipolar systems, the article argues that it may
also be applied to regional unipolar systems, and that these are useful for
examining the conditions under which soft balancing occurs. This argument
is illustrated through the soft-balancing behaviors displayed by Argentina,
Mexico, and other Latin American states in response to U.S. interventions from
the 1890s to 1930s. In conclusion, the article suggests further directions for the
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study of soft balancing, while noting that its consequences for U.S. policy-
makers might not be as dire as many scholars have feared.
The Debate over Soft Balancing
The debate over soft balancing, chieºy in the pages of this journal, has been
characterized by a focus on unilateral U.S. actions and the international re-
sponses to those actions. The key cases reºected responses from secondary
powers—primarily China, France, Germany, and Russia—to the United States
during the administration of George W. Bush. Although there have been some
empirical disagreements over the facts of these cases, the primary disagree-
ment has been over whether these states’ actions represent a response to a per-
ceived increase in the threat posed by the world’s lone superpower. This
article takes no position on which recent events might qualify as soft balancing
versus policy bargaining; instead it seeks to clarify the concept and ask
whether that concept can help illuminate historical situations in which
there were multilateral attempts to constrain the unilateral use of U.S. power
by means other than military confrontation.
The argument for soft balancing, advanced by international relations
luminaries such as Robert Pape, Stephen Walt, T.V. Paul, Charles Kupchan,
and Robert Art, has received well-reasoned criticism from Stephen Brooks and
William Wohlforth.10 Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander have questioned
evidence of any balancing behavior today, dismissively saying “that discus-
sion of soft balancing is much ado about nothing.”11 The crux of Brooks and
Wohlforth’s critique is that the original soft-balancing argument fails to con-
sider alternative explanations for these states’ behaviors. Many of the actions
taken have been overblown and are not systematic attempts to constrain and
balance the United States. Instead, they are better understood as “diplomatic
friction,” in Lieber and Alexander’s words, that frequently accompanies policy
bargaining. Moreover, some of the behaviors originate as responses to domes-
tic politics.12 This article takes care to consider the critiques and alternative ex-
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planations offered by Brooks and Wohlforth. To begin, it reviews the literature
on soft balancing with an eye to spelling out the crucial elements of a distinct
concept of soft balancing that avoids risks of “conceptual stretching.”13 This is
an important exercise if scholars are to apply the term beyond the circum-
stances for which it was developed.
Realist scholars traditionally saw balancing as the natural, almost automatic
response of states in an anarchical system to the rise of a new power.14 This
theory led to numerous predictions that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and
with it the bipolar world order, would spur the rise of a new balancing coali-
tion.15 Although there have been important critiques of the ubiquity of balanc-
ing behavior, from hegemonic-stability theory realists,16 historically oriented
scholars,17 and from many outside realism,18 the theory’s parsimony retains
considerable appeal. As Brooks and Wohlforth note, soft balancing derives
part of its conceptual purchase from its implied relation to the balance of
power. At the same time, the seeming longevity of U.S. unipolarity, a quarter
century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has led international relations scholars
to dedicate greater study to the dynamics of the unipolar world.19
In the early 2000s, these two developments in international relations theory
intersected. Spurred largely by concern about the long-term consequences of
the United States’ seemingly unprecedented embrace of preventive war, Pape
and others termed the strong international opposition to the U.S. doctrine as
“soft balancing.” What are the key components of soft balancing? First, it
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seemingly pertains only to situations of unipolarity. This excludes interna-
tional systems that vary in either direction. In bipolar or multipolar systems,
states could adopt traditional balancing coalitions to contain the dominant
power. In the other direction, if a system were hegemonic, balancing would
not be feasible given the power and control exercised by the hegemon.20 In a
recent article, Ilai Saltzman divorces soft balancing from questions of polarity
(and balance of power theory generally), looking at U.S. policy toward inter-
war Japan as soft balancing.21 Saltzman argues that soft balancing is a foreign
policy strategy; in this he is correct. Hard balancing is also a foreign policy
strategy. Separating balancing behavior from questions of coalitions and polar-
ity is a mistake, as it risks collapsing almost any nonmilitary response—even
by the dominant power—to a change in the distribution of capabilities into
soft balancing.
Second, soft balancing is not a direct response to a preponderance of power,
but to perceptions of power and fear of its unilateral use. It responds to what
Walt called the “balance of threat.”22 This change helps explain why no imme-
diate rebalancing occurred when it became clear in 1990 that the United States
had emerged as the unquestioned sole superpower. The post–Cold War United
States did not appear to threaten the sovereignty of the vast majority of states
in the international system; its military interventions often had at least a ve-
neer of institutional legitimacy that promised a restoration of sovereign rights.
Nor is the United States’ tremendous wealth predicated on territorial ex-
pansion. In short, the United States was a “constrained hegemon,” as Paul
argued.23 The question of threat instead of power alone places a great degree
of importance on the intentions of the unipole, or rather on how those inten-
tions are perceived by other states. If the unipole is perceived as possessing
self-restraint, and particularly if it provides beneªts in the form of private or
public goods, the costs of checking the unipole will outweigh the beneªts. This
difference represents a signiªcant departure from realists’ traditional empha-
sis on the inherent uncertainty of intentions, stressed especially by John
Mearsheimer.24 If the unipole is perceived as increasingly imperialistic, soft or
even hard balancing is likely to be employed. Soft-balancing behaviors are not
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limited to responses to direct threats from the unipole. Pape argues that sec-
ondary powers can be driven by indirect threats, as in European concerns over
the planned 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Bush Doctrine’s claim of a right to
unilateral preventive war, because they fear blowback, the spillover of regional
insecurity, or a destabilizing precedent. They might also fear that the unipole is
seeking hegemony, which would materially lessen secondary states’ autonomy
and well-being.25 The implications are enormous: if power alone were the is-
sue, the only way the unipolar state could prevent balancing would be to be-
come less powerful—an unlikely proposition—or become a hegemon, a tall
order bringing its own risks. In a balance of threat world, changes to the
unipole’s behaviors can obviate the need for balancing.
Third, soft balancing is primarily a nonmilitary strategy.26 States deploy a
host of other instruments instead. Pape notes, “Mechanisms of soft balancing
include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and
signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition.”27 Providing aid to
rivals, including nonstate actors, and excluding the unipole from multilateral
political and economic organizations have also been discussed as strategies.28
Along these lines, states engaged in soft balancing seek to limit the ability of
the unipole to “impose its preferences on others” through coordinated action,
attempts to augment power, and countervailing coalitions.29 Walt emphasizes
cooperation as an important aspect of soft balancing: “In the current era of U.S.
dominance, therefore, soft balancing is the conscious coordination of diplo-
matic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, out-
comes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some
degree of mutual support.”30
More controversially, soft balancing is often seen as a possible precursor to
hard balancing. Soft balancing is a lower-cost, lower-risk strategy for second-
ary states to pursue their priorities without provoking the overwhelming
power of the unipole. Forming a balancing coalition is always a risky en-
deavor, in which individual states have incentives to pass the buck, free ride,
or shirk. Building cooperation is particularly difªcult in a unipolar system;
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more states must coordinate their actions, and the unipole can inºict high costs
on states that oppose it.
One of the main criticisms of soft balancing is that it is indistinguishable
from the normal course of diplomacy and international bargaining that re-
sult from disagreements over policy. Brooks and Wohlforth call soft balancing
“a portentous-sounding term to describe conventional policy disputes and
diplomatic bargaining” with U.S. interlocutors after the fall of the Soviet
Union. They argue that these disputes seem important only because uni-
polarity does not provide a frame of reference for real balancing behaviors, as
a bipolar or multipolar world did.31 Advancing a similar critique, Lieber and
Alexander argue: “The events used to detect the presence of soft balancing are
so typical in history that they are not, and perhaps cannot be, distinguished
from routine diplomatic friction between countries, even between allies.”32 Al-
though shades of gray will continue to exist, useful distinctions can be drawn
between the two. Art argues that both routine policy bargaining and soft bal-
ancing are inherently focused on outcomes vis-à-vis the unipole. Soft balanc-
ing, however, is a future-oriented strategy: “[P]olicy bargaining is the attempt
to produce favorable outcomes with current assets, whereas balancing behav-
ior is the attempt to augment assets so as to produce better outcomes the next
time.”33 Both the temporal and coalition aspects of soft balancing can be used
to help distinguish it from “routine diplomatic friction.” Kupchan argues that
even if many of the behaviors associated with soft balancing are “mundane,”
they may still be consequential in geopolitical terms. What matters are the in-
tentions to constrain the unipole and the consequences of the actions taken by
soft-balancing states.34
In addition, Brooks and Wohlforth point to the importance of considering al-
ternative explanations: states could be pursuing economic interests, posturing
for domestic political aims, or worrying about regional security. Although
these possibilities must be considered, it is important to recognize that the ex-
planations are not mutually exclusive. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that any
balancing behavior, soft or hard, must be a response to a concentration of
power. A concentration of power could threaten states’ economic interests
(and thus their ability to maintain or develop their own power), drawing pol-
icy responses that seek to both constrain the unipole and advance economic in-
terests. Domestic politics and regional security could complement rather than
contradict balancing motives.
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Concepts and Cases
Soft balancing requires further development, both empirical and conceptual.
This section strengthens the concept by highlighting the implicit use of con-
cepts identiªed with institutionalism and constructivism in a debate about bal-
ancing behavior. It justiªes the extension of the soft-balancing debate to a
period and region that scholars have previously overlooked for theoretical and
empirical reasons. Finally, it argues that the case of Latin American responses
to U.S. interventionism is particularly useful for examining arguments about
why soft balancing—as opposed to either hard or no balancing—occurs.
enriching soft balancing
Soft balancing is, foremost, a foreign policy strategy that aims to constrain
through nonmilitary means how, where, and why a unipole deploys its un-
rivaled military power. It does not refer to the balance of power as existing
equilibrium in the international system.35 Soft balancing does not need to be
successful to exist, just as hard balancing has existed as a strategy despite fail-
ure. It could be, but is not necessarily, a precursor to hard balancing. Soft bal-
ancing emphasizes secondary states’ perceptions of the threat posed by the
unipole, meaning that changes in perceptions will lead to changes in balancing
behavior. Soft balancing is not an inevitable reaction to the growth of another
state’s power. Soft balancing is distinct from policy bargaining, which is nar-
rowly focused on a given issue, because it has a longer time horizon and seeks
to limit not just one particular use of power but the unipole’s ability to deploy
that power in the future by augmenting the resources available to secondary
states. Soft balancing is likely when secondary states begin to see the unipole
as a direct or indirect threat to their national interests.36
Soft balancing, like balance of power theory more generally, has largely been
the domain of realists. An examination of soft balancing, however, shows the
possibilities for more explicit dialogue between institutionalist and construc-
tivist approaches and debates about balancing. These are worth exploring in
two areas: the question of changing perceptions of unipolar intentions and the
institutional and normative strategies employed by soft balancers. The ques-
tion of changing perceptions of unipolar intentions goes beyond Walt’s criteria
for “threat.” He lists these as power resources (or strength), geographical
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proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions.37 Because resources,
geography, and offensive capabilities are too ªxed to spark soft balancing
against a unipole, the explanatory onus falls entirely on intentions—and more
to the point, other states’ perceptions of those intentions, a matter on which
Wohlforth made signal contributions a decade before the soft-balancing de-
bate.38 Constructivists have long emphasized the interplay between a state’s
actions and how its role in international relations is deªned.39 The United
States alone cannot deªne itself as a “benign hegemon,” a role that depends
not just on U.S. words and actions but on how those are intersubjectively per-
ceived by other actors in the international system. The United States almost
certainly did not intend to weaken that perception in 2003, but others’ under-
standings of U.S. doctrines and actions did just that. An analysis of soft balanc-
ing must be attentive to how perceptions of intentions affect the roles states
play in international politics.
Soft balancing employs tactics that have often received short shrift from re-
alists, which has likely contributed to the dismissal of the concept by some
critics. If international institutions are epiphenomenal to the distribution of
power, as many realists have argued,40 then they cannot create serious chal-
lenges to that distribution. Soft balancing is also discussed as a method of
overcoming coordination problems under anarchy, drawing on institutional-
ist theorizing advanced by Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, and others.41
Secondary states can use institutions to address various needs: at times they
may facilitate coordination with or in opposition to a unipolar power;
they may also be forums to publicize and delegitimize unipolar unilateral-
ism. The above scholars offer additional insights into how institutional soft-
balancing tactics might constrain the unipole. Institutionalism has emphasized
the information-sharing role of international institutions, which may allow po-
tential soft balancers opportunities to demand disclosure, reporting, and mon-
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itoring from the unipole. Secondary states may use international institutions to
press the unipole to make public commitments; whereas the unipole’s power
may let it break commitments, international institutions increase the publicity
of a commitment and therefore enhance domestic and international audience
costs.42 Publicly reneging on commitments could further erode perceptions of
benign intent. The question of perceived U.S. intentions has been central to the
soft-balancing debate, though “intentions” in these discussions have not been
limited to narrower understandings of what the United States will do in a par-
ticular situation. Beneath the surface, the question of “benign hegemony” is ac-
tually about what role the United States will play in the international system—
what will the United States’ identity be? The constructivist literature offers
insights into the intersubjective construction of state identity and its conse-
quences.43 Constructivism also has much to offer for scholars’ understanding
of normative soft-balancing tactics, including how states may use “rhetorical
entrapment” to constrain U.S. actions or to increase the costs of those actions.44
A constructivist reading of soft balancing might focus on how the unipole
seeks to build legitimacy for its actions, while opposing coalitions seek to deny
it, thus imposing costs and affecting decisionmaking.
polarity and soft balancing
A key reason for the presentist nature of the debate is that soft balancing has
been understood as pertaining to global unipolar systems. The power advan-
tage of the unipole encourages states to soft balance instead of resorting to mil-
itary balancing. In bipolar or multipolar systems, shifting alliances allow states
to compensate for the growing power of a single actor. The implicit assump-
tion has been that because the post–Cold War era is the only modern unipolar
system, other relevant cases of soft balancing do not exist.
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The Western Hemisphere at the turn of the twentieth century, however, pro-
vides such an example, nested within a multipolar world. During the period,
the degree of power asymmetry between the United States and its neighbors
became apparent. In 1900 U.S. national income per capita was $1,495, more
than 600 percent greater than the average $220 in Latin America.45 The United
States had a blue-water navy that had just defeated the Spanish Empire on
both sides of the globe, while most Latin American countries were limited to a
“brown-water” navy of riverine boats and a few ships for coastal patrols.46 Al-
though this advantage allowed the United States to establish its authority over
some of the small states in the Caribbean and Central America, it never estab-
lished hegemony over the entire hemisphere. With regard to the South Ameri-
can subsystem, the relationship with the United States cannot be understood
either as multipolar—the U.S. advantage was too great—or hegemonic—U.S.
control was inadequate.
Even if the United States had established a unipolar position within the
hemisphere, did global multipolarity offer the secondary powers of Latin
America other options for traditional balancing? Although in theory, and to
some extent in commerce, these options did exist, options for hard balancing
through military alliances with extrahemispheric powers was not feasible. De-
spite sporadic U.S. fears about an intrusion by Wilhelmine Germany, only two
extrahemispheric powers had noteworthy presences in Latin America. The
ªrst was Spain. Most of Latin America had fought—or in the case of Cuba,
continued to ªght—for liberation from Spain, and the possibility for an alli-
ance against the United States was slight. More important, the Iberian power
was in advanced decline by the turn of the century, and the war of 1898
deªnitively established its military impotence. Great Britain, the second extra-
hemispheric power, was more noteworthy, especially as a commercial part-
ner. The United States, however, had steadily pushed the British out of the
Caribbean and Central America, a shift highlighted by the repudiation of
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which had granted equal U.S. and British rights to
railways and a future canal across the Central American isthmus. The possibil-
ity of military alliance with Great Britain throughout the hemisphere declined
steadily throughout the period. Although South American independence hero
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Simón Bolívar and some of his contemporaries advocated alliance with Great
Britain early in the nineteenth century, and France and French culture certainly
had advocates, the feasibility of these arrangements had declined dramatically
by the last quarter of the century. The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine
that the hemisphere was closed to European powers, which was presumptu-
ous in 1823, had become effective by the eve of the World War I, at least in
terms of military alliances. If Latin American states were going to constrain the
growing power of the United States, they would have to do so largely on their
own. It is worth noting that there are numerous precedents for treating a por-
tion of the world as a system in its own right. This has often been done, with-
out explicit recognition, in discussions of the European balance of power.47
Considering the Western Hemisphere as a unipolar system in its own right
during this period is thus historically accurate and theoretically useful.
conditions for soft balancing: geography, restraint, and asymmetry
“Discovering” another example of a unipolar system offers strong grounds
to examine possible soft-balancing behaviors, given the dearth of possible
comparative cases. It also provides evidence to examine the conditions, such
as geography, perceptions of unipolar restraint (or its opposite), and power
differentials, that Pape and others have argued either provoke or dissuade sec-
ondary powers from engaging in soft balancing. In doing so, it seeks to better
specify the concept of soft balancing.
The case of Latin American responses to the United States in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries is analogous to the current debate on soft
balancing in ways beyond the existence of effective unipolarity. The period
was marked by an explicit change in stated U.S. doctrine, from an interpreta-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine that focused on excluding European powers to the
Roosevelt Corollary, in which the United States declared its own right and
duty to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors. This change of policy
was accompanied by major changes in practice. “Gunboat diplomacy” by the
United States and European powers had been common—and frequently de-
nounced by Latin Americans—in the late 1890s; now the United States began
a period of larger military interventions. Importantly, these changes led to a
number of occupations of much longer duration than previous military epi-
sodes. Although it might be an exaggeration to say U.S. intentions were
considered benign before 1898, given the Mexican experience and widespread
suspicion of ªlibustering expeditions, the combination of growing U.S. eco-
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nomic and military clout and the alacrity with which it was employed spurred
a new level of concern. It also led to important changes in the behavior of the
secondary powers in Latin America. As described below, these behaviors mesh
with Walt’s description of balancing behavior: “If states are in fact choosing to
coordinate action, augment their power, and take on new commitments with
others, because they are worried about the unipole’s dominant position and/
or are alarmed by the actions it is undertaking, it is appropriate to regard such
behavior as a form of balancing.”48
Proponents of the soft-balancing concept have focused on two explanations
for limited balancing against the United States before 2003. First, they empha-
size the geographical isolation of the United States from secondary powers.
This has been understood as a constant, because more geographically proxi-
mate states in Latin America and the Caribbean have been deemed too minor
to display important balancing behaviors or were subjected to a U.S sphere of
inºuence, empire, or hierarchy.49 Taking Latin American responses more seri-
ously allows for an examination of the effects of varying distance. Second, the
debate around soft balancing has focused on a perceived shift in U.S. inten-
tions, with proponents arguing that a primary reason for the lack of earlier bal-
ancing behavior after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the perception
that the United States was a restrained hegemon. From at least the 1890s
through the early 1930s, however, many countries in the Western Hemisphere
did not share a belief in the benign intentions of the United States.
The following case, therefore, offers the opportunity for comparison with
those that have been examined in the literature. It is not intended to “test” soft
balancing; the literature does not currently offer a fully formed theory of
soft balancing from which testable hypotheses could be derived. Instead, soft
balancing is treated as a concept. Gary Goertz writes, “Developing a concept is
more than providing a deªnition; it is deciding what is important about an-
entity.”50 As Goertz argues, concepts should be both empirical and theoretical.
The application of a concept to new empirics allows scholars to ask whether
that concept helps illuminate events and processes. The case at hand sheds
light on which unipolar behaviors may spur soft balancing, the motivations
and tactics of the balancers, and how the practice of soft balancing need not in-
evitably lead to hard balancing or bring bad outcomes for the United States.
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The Case: Soft Balancing against the United States, 1898–1936
From the late 1890s to the 1930s, the wealthiest Latin American country,
Argentina, soon joined by the ªrst revolutionary power of the twentieth cen-
tury, Mexico, undertook what would become a hemispheric effort to constrain
the ability of the United States to deploy military force in Latin America. Their
distinct geopolitical interests and national diplomatic traditions led them to
take the lead at critical moments in efforts at soft balancing that coincided or
were directly coordinated. This was not merely diplomatic friction over tran-
sient disputes but represented a sustained, systemic balancing effort through
coalition building, international law, and multinational institutions.
Latin America in the early twentieth century faced a United States so dispro-
portionately powerful that it had been able to absorb half of Mexico’s territory
in 1848, replace Spanish colonial rule directly in Puerto Rico and indirectly in
Cuba in 1898, take control of a wide swath of Panama in 1903, then send the
Marines to govern directly or rule by proxy in Nicaragua (1912–33), Haiti
(1915–34), and the Dominican Republic (1916–24). The end of U.S. occupa-
tions in the circum-Caribbean that followed is typically credited to Franklin
Roosevelt’s benevolence and the “Good Neighbor policy” he (and his prede-
cessor, Herbert Hoover) determined would be more advantageous to the
United States by reducing the costs of occupation once compliant dictator-
ships were keeping order on their own. In fact, as explained below, the dicta-
tors were not always so compliant, and Roosevelt’s decision to commit the
United States formally to a policy of nonintervention in Latin America was not
an act of noblesse oblige but the culmination of several decades of diplomatic
and legal activism in multinational forums by Latin American countries in
what appears now to have been a strategy of soft balancing.
Just as the 2002–03 soft-balancing effort by France, Germany, and Russia to
oppose the U.S. invasion of Iraq took place in the United Nations, much of
Latin America’s soft-balancing project unfolded in the context of the emerging
inter-American diplomatic system, the recurring conferences launched in 1889
as part of the U.S.-sponsored project of Pan-Americanism. David Sheinin has
described Pan-Americanism as a program to integrate Latin America into a
U.S.-led system based on political, commercial, legal, and defense coordina-
tion.51 Argentina led the opposition to U.S. initiatives in this process, often
sponsoring its own counterproposals centered on the defense of national sov-
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ereignty. That led Nicaraguan nationalist poet Rubén Darío to prophesy that
“on the balance scales of the American continent, it is the Argentine Republic
that gives us the counterweight to Yankee power.”52 After the Mexican
Revolution of 1910–17, Mexico, too, played a leading role in rallying opposition
to U.S. intervention in the region. This pattern persisted through recurring inter-
American conferences—the precursors to the current system centered on the
Organization of American States—between 1889 and 1936, when the United
States ªnally agreed without reservations to Latin American demands to for-
mally renounce military intervention in the hemisphere as a tool of statecraft.
Taken in isolation, each confrontation at each conference, it could be argued,
might be better understood as falling into the category of the “conventional
policy disputes and diplomatic bargaining” Brooks and Wohlforth describe.
The whole record of decades of maneuvering to get the United States ulti-
mately to endorse the principle of nonintervention, however, seems much
more signiªcant than the sum of its parts. Indeed, it represents a striking case
of soft balancing as an alternative to bandwagoning for weaker powers.
The two lesser powers each had its own reasons for challenging U.S. hard
power. Mexico’s interest in constraining military intervention is self-evident,
not only because of the traumatic loss of its northern territory in the 1840s, but
because of the U.S. shelling and occupation for ªve months of the port of
Veracruz (1914) and the yearlong campaign by Gen. John Pershing and his
army of 10,000 men, who repeatedly violated Mexican sovereignty to try to
stop border incursions by Mexican rebels (1916). Moreover, Mexico’s foreign
policy has never been conªned to the subservient position implied in the fa-
mous lament of its last prerevolution autocrat, Porªrio Díaz: “Poor Mexico, so
far from God, so close to the United States.” Díaz himself diverged from
U.S. policy in Central America, and Mexico carved out substantial room for
independent stands after the revolution and throughout the Cold War.53
Argentina, which initiated the balancing project in the early twentieth cen-
tury, may in our time seem an unlikely country to have launched a bid for in-
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ternational leadership, but in those days it was widely recognized to be on the
ascendant. By 1910 Argentina was the world’s largest grain exporter and had
the highest per capita level of international trade on Earth. Buenos Aires
boasted a world-famous opera, a subway, and the second-largest port in the
Americas (after New York). Europeans favored the expression “as rich as an
Argentine.”54 When it began to oppose the United States in international
forums, Argentina drew the ire of perplexed U.S. ofªcials, who found the
country to be needlessly vindictive and ascribed its actions to excessive
pride and unreasonable hostility (a similar reading of French and German be-
havior in 2003).55 Argentina was in a position to anchor a soft-balancing coali-
tion in part because of geographical factors: not only was Argentina remote
from the United States, but the Pampas region produced similar agricultural
goods to the U.S. heartland, making the two countries commercial competitors
and directing Argentine exporters’ gaze toward the industrial powers of
Europe. That made Argentina less dependent on the United States than the
Central American and Caribbean countries were. For Argentine elites, the eco-
nomic success of their country, the European origin of most of its population,
and its important role in transatlantic trade justiªed the assertion of a leader-
ship role in the Americas.56
The Pan-American project arose in a context of competition among empires.
While Europeans fought over the resources and markets of the developing
world through intervention in Africa and Asia, the United States entered the
fray in the War of 1898 and with expansive versions of the Monroe Doctrine in
the Olney (1895) and Roosevelt (1904) Corollaries that asserted a U.S. right to
intervene at will throughout Latin America. As the United States increased its
investments in South America, Argentine leaders, like their counterparts in
Brazil and Chile, calculated the costs and beneªts of aligning with one of the
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great powers. Brazil’s practice of bandwagoning with the United States rather
than seeking to balance it dated from the era of the Baron of Rio Branco (José
Maria da Silva Paranhos Jr.), who spent a decade (1902–1912) as Brazil’s for-
eign minister. He sought to boost his country’s quest for regional leadership
and balance Argentina’s growing strength by aligning Brazil’s foreign policy
with that of its biggest coffee customer, the United States, receiving as a re-
ward the ªrst U.S. ambassadorship accredited to South America. In Pan-
American conferences, Brazil was generally a reliable partner of the United
States.57 Chile’s concerns in this era included preventing external interference
in its territorial disputes with Peru and defending its right to maintain neutral-
ity in World War I. Chile opposed a Brazilian project to get Latin American
countries to adopt the Monroe Doctrine as a continental declaration, citing U.S.
intervention in the Caribbean.58
There was more to Argentine policy than rhetorical cover for entering the
geopolitical bazaar or the ºeeting pleasure of grandiloquent, self-inºicted
wounds. Soft balancing was a more substantial and effective program than has
been acknowledged, and one that replaced the leverage available to lesser
powers from latching onto the force of a great power with the leverage avail-
able from appropriating the legitimacy increasingly tied in the twentieth cen-
tury to international norms and multilateral institutions. This strategy was not
designed at a single moment or even recognized by its authors as such. As
Michael Fortmann, T.V. Paul, and James Wirtz have observed, “[S]oft balanc-
ing strategies are ad hoc.”59 Instead, it developed in stages with multiple lines
of origin involving cooperation among a shifting constellation of foreign part-
ners, including many other Latin American players. Nonetheless, in the initial
effort to counterbalance the growing U.S. threat to the autonomy of Latin
American and Caribbean states, Argentina led the way.
The Argentine strategy focused on changing international norms for in-
terstate behavior through law, diplomacy, and multinational institutions.
Argentina’s most famous international jurist-diplomats, Carlos Calvo (1824–
1906) and Luis María Drago (1859–1921), promoted formal doctrines designed
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to constrain the great powers from violating the national sovereignty of
weaker powers by using force to collect debts. Gunboat diplomacy practiced
by the great powers made the rights of foreign capital an existential question
for Latin American debtor nations, including Argentina. Argentine thinkers
had been wrestling for some time with the need to preserve inºows of foreign
capital while protecting weaker Latin American states from the power of the
investors’ home governments when disputes arose. As early as the 1860s,
Calvo began to campaign for an absolute prohibition on diplomatic or military
intervention for debt collection. At a time when most European countries
and the United States promulgated a doctrine of diplomatic protection that
held that their nationals were entitled to preferential treatment and effective
extraterritorial sovereignty, Calvo argued in his Le droit international théorique
et pratique [Theoretical and Practical International Law] (1868) that parties that
develop grievances in the course of doing business in a foreign country must
seek redress through that country’s judicial system rather than turning to their
home governments for satisfaction.60 When diplomatic or military pressure led
to one country’s nationals being compensated ahead of other claimants, this
violated the principle of pari passu, which holds that creditors should be paid
equally and without preference. (A century later, pari passu was central to the
dispute between Argentina and a few hedge fund investors unsatisªed with
the debt rescheduling negotiated with most of its creditors.)61
Although the Calvo Doctrine did not ªnd formal acceptance in international
law,62 Argentine diplomats followed Calvo by continuing to press for the
adoption of new norms to constrain the great powers—increasingly directed at
balancing the United States—in international venues.63 Secretary of State
James Blaine launched the First Pan-American Conference in 1889 to try to cre-
ate a customs union and system of arbitration in Latin America, both under
U.S. leadership. The Argentine delegation, led by future president Roque
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Sáenz Peña, was successful in rallying Latin American support to block the
U.S. projects, and pressed, over U.S. objections, its own resolutions prohibiting
territorial conquest and asserting the juridical equality of states.64 At the
Second Pan-American Conference in 1902–03, Argentina submitted a version
of the Calvo Doctrine, prohibiting extraterritorial intervention (diplomatic or
military) to resolve pecuniary disputes and holding that natives and foreigners
were equal before the law. By articulating a concern widespread in Latin
America and persuasively lobbying the other delegations, the Argentines suc-
ceeded in isolating the United States: every delegation present signed the reso-
lution except the United States and Haiti.65
The confrontation between Argentina and the United States came into sharp
relief in the same period over the Venezuela crisis. In 1902–03, a joint naval
force sponsored by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy shelled and occupied
Venezuelan ports after the Venezuelan government fell behind on loan pay-
ments during its civil war. The events provoked outrage in Argentina; as
its leading daily, La Nación, editorialized, the attack was “a latent aggres-
sion against any of the nations that have grown from the same cradle. Today
you, tomorrow me.”66 While belatedly objecting to European intervention,
President Theodore Roosevelt articulated a special U.S. right to intervene, to
exercise “international police power” in the hemisphere, in what came to be
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt’s motto
“Speak softly but carry a big stick” acquired new resonance for Latin
Americans, who thought the big stick was pointed at them. Their fears seemed
realized when Roosevelt, dissatisªed with Colombian demands in negotiating
rights to an isthmian canal, helped revolutionaries break Panama away from
Colombia in 1903. The Roosevelt Corollary and the interventions in Panama,
Cuba (1906), and the Dominican Republic (1905), where the United States set
up a customs receivership to ensure foreign investors would be ªrst in line for
any government revenues, conªrmed Latin American concerns. As in 2003, the
combination of U.S. actions and explicit doctrine spurred soft balancing by
secondary powers. Marshaling Latin American opposition, Foreign Minister
Drago wrote a message to the Roosevelt administration calling for an absolute
prohibition on military intervention in “the territory of American nations.”67
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The Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa proclaimed that Argentina was
fulªlling its “great mission” by “defending the principle of sovereignty for all
Latin America in the face of the Big Stick.”68
Drago’s message to Roosevelt might have been forgotten had it not been for
Calvo’s seizing the moment to campaign for its acceptance in international
law. Drago asked him to give the doctrine the widest possible circulation.69
Calvo was exhilarated: “For more than forty years I have been ªghting the
practice of armed interventions, whatever the cause that motivates them, and
I am prepared to decidedly support the principles so accurately articulated by
your excellency and that have my enthusiastic support.”70 As Argentine minis-
ter to France and a member of both the Institut de France and the Institut de
Droit International in Paris, Calvo appealed to his network of fellow jurists
throughout Western Europe to formally state their support for the Drago
Doctrine.71 Leading international law experts who signed on included Frédéric
Passy, president of the French Society for International Arbitration and joint
winner of the ªrst Nobel Peace Prize in 1901; Gustave Moynier, president of
the International Committee of the Red Cross; André Weiss, author of Manuel
de droit international privé [Manual of Private International Law]; and Thomas
Erskine Holland of Oxford University and author of Studies in International
Law.72 That enabled Argentina to draw upon the soft resources of legitimacy
represented by the world’s preeminent authorities on international law when
making claims within the international system.
The contrasting visions of appropriate behavior of states clashed visibly
in international forums. At the Third Pan-American Conference in 1906,
Argentina sought the adoption of the Drago Doctrine forbidding military
intervention, but the United States managed to thwart the resolution. At
the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, the Argentine delegation
and some of the supporters Calvo had mobilized in Europe were determined
to see the Drago Doctrine enshrined in international law. The delegates of the
great powers, especially Great Britain and the United States, were determined
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to vitiate it. The initial British position was essentially that Britannia waived
the rules. The British delegation’s instructions were “to reserve the right
of the Governments of the injured individuals to decide for themselves in each
case whether a resort to armed interference would be justiªed.” But faced with
pressure from a score of countries to support the Argentine position, British
Foreign Secretary Edward Grey then consented to align his government with
the U.S. proposal that placed international arbitration as an intermediate step
between complaint and armed intervention.73 As an alternative to war to settle
disputes, arbitration was widely accepted in Latin America, including in
Argentina, which both practiced and preached its virtues, agreeing to arbitra-
tion in boundary disputes with Chile and Brazil.74
The U.S. position was not to reject the Drago Doctrine outright, but to
embrace it with ªngers crossed. Although personally impressed by Drago’s
erudition and diplomatic skills,75 the U.S. and British delegations joined forces
to amend his doctrine with a loophole big enough to sail a gunboat through.
Where Drago had spoken of public debt and an absolute prohibition
on military force, the amended version pushed through by U.S. dele-
gate Col. Horace Porter referred only to “contractual debts” and called for
compulsory arbitration—after which noncompliance by the debtor nation
could be punished by military action. Latin Americans present understood
that this hardly barred gunboat diplomacy; as Argentina’s delegate Roque
Sáenz Peña put it, the arrangement “envisaged international Judges as the ad-
versaries of sovereignty, and as the enemies of national honor.”76 Argentina
registered two formal reservations, calling for disputes over contractual debts
not to be submitted to international arbitration but to go before national
courts, and stating that public loans “cannot in any circumstances give rise to
military aggression.”77 The “Porter Doctrine” that supplanted Drago at The
Hague immediately sparked a clash with Latin American countries over repre-
sentation at the International Court of Justice, which the United States and
Great Britain sought to dominate, and where Argentina, Brazil, and other
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Latin American states demanded equal representation—not only on the prin-
ciple of the juridical equality of states, but to ward off the possibility that
the international body would become merely one more instrument for fu-
ture intervention.
Were the story to end there, with defeat snatched from the jaws of vic-
tory at The Hague, the Argentine exercise in soft balancing would have
been insigniªcant, an ignominious failure. But by taking a longer view, one can
see the seeds planted by Calvo and Drago, and the consistent tradition in
Argentine foreign policy of pushing back against U.S. projects of hemispheric
integration under its leadership, growing and bearing fruit. The Latin
American countries that joined Argentina in expressing reservations along
similar lines at The Hague included Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, and Uruguay.78
Having failed to persuade the entire conference to go along, Latin American
governments began taking matters into their own hands, changing by national
law the international norms on intervention within the Americas. They incor-
porated Calvo’s principles into the language of contracts with foreign corpora-
tions, legal statutes, and even their constitutions in the form of the so-called
Calvo Clause, requiring parties doing business under those laws or contracts
to agree to be bound by the host country’s judicial system. (Among the
countries that at one point included a version of the Calvo Doctrine in their
constitutions are Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and
Venezuela.) Foreigners who wanted to do business in those countries had to
agree to the new terms restoring national sovereignty over international cap-
ital or look elsewhere for investment opportunities.79 Argentina, along with
numerous Latin American supporters, advanced international norms with far-
reaching effects beyond what could be traced in the letter of international law.
As renowned newspaper editor William Stead put it in 1908, Drago was “the
one man” who had “permanently changed” international relations through in-
ternational law, making his name “deservedly famous around the world.”80 At
this early date, the Argentine strategy of rallying multinational opposition to
unilateral intervention through international organizations had borne fruit.
The key role played by particular individuals further demonstrates the theo-
retical value of linking soft balancing with constructivist insights.
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Enter Mexico
If Argentina’s faded grandeur is largely forgotten by today’s international rela-
tions community, so is Mexico’s outsized impact on international relations
in the inter-American system—as is the importance of their synchronized op-
position to U.S. military intervention. During the long Porªrio Díaz regime
(1877–1911), U.S. ofªcials generally considered Mexico a compliant ally, wel-
coming of U.S. investments and unlikely to lead opposition to U.S. foreign pol-
icy. Theodore Roosevelt went so far as to propose that reliable Mexico should
annex Cuba and the Dominican Republic and also “run” Central America.81
Nonetheless, prerevolutionary Mexico was not a vassal state, and Mexican
ofªcials objected to U.S. interventions, including in Nicaragua in 1909, when
Mexican Ambassador Enrique Creel devoted his Christmas holiday to trying
to persuade President William Howard Taft not to land troops. Creel saw it
as his objective to “defend principles of international law that are of interest
to the good harmony of a whole continent,” and reported sympathy from
nearly every Latin American envoy in Washington.82 Argentina’s envoy
in Mexico City, Juan Agustín García, saw a “new round of imperialist policy in
Washington.” Cooperation between the two countries provided an opportu-
nity. “We should seek the closest relations possible with Mexico,” he wrote to
his ministry, “in order to establish a balance in the Americas.” Their goal
should be “counteracting the inºuence and dominating tendencies of the
Colossus of the North.”83
Argentina won some goodwill with Mexico during the revolution, when
President Woodrow Wilson ordered the occupation of Veracruz, and Argentina
stepped in with an offer to mediate, along with Brazil and Chile. The coun-
tries’ mediation, which fundamentally assumed that the occupation was ille-
gitimate, helped bring the crisis to a peaceful end with U.S. withdrawal and
“nulliªed the aims of the United States’ armed intervention,” as the Argentine
foreign minister put it.84 The three countries reached out again during
Pershing’s punitive expedition in Mexico in 1916, again winning Mexican grat-
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After the revolution, Mexico would present the most thoroughgoing chal-
lenge to foreign investment and U.S. interests by asserting, in stages, control
over its own mineral resources in Article 27 of the new constitution; incorpo-
rating the Calvo Clause stricture that ªnancial disputes with foreigners must
go before Mexican courts in Article 103; and then nationalizing foreign petro-
leum enterprises outright in 1938. That challenge is well known. Less remem-
bered in U.S. policymaking circles is that it was coupled with an ambitious
foreign policy agenda aimed at spreading the revolution’s conceptions of in-
ternational behavior to other states in the Americas. President Venustiano
Carranza (1917–20) issued what came to be known as the Carranza Doctrine
in 1918, embodying Mexico’s vision of how international affairs should be
conducted: all nations are equal under the law, which meant that there could
be no legitimate intervention, with no exceptions. Nationals and foreigners are
also equal under the law and subject to the sovereignty of the state where
they reside, meaning there could be no extraterritoriality or special protections
for foreign investors.86 This point illustrates a problem with Brooks and
Wohlforth’s presentation of economic motives as an alternative explanation; in
this instance, Mexican economic policy was closely intertwined with the coun-
try’s attempts to curtail the United States’ arbitrary use of unilateral power.
Mexico’s commitment to the principles of nonintervention and the juridical
equality of states could be expected of a country that had lost half its territory
to its powerful northern neighbor. Obsessed with interventions because it had
been the object of the obsessive attentions of intervening powers, Mexico later
codiªed this doctrine as the ofªcial foreign policy of the state in Article 89,
section 10 of the Constitution: “The Executive Power will observe the follow-
ing ruling principles: self-determination of peoples, nonintervention, peaceful
resolution of disputes, the proscription of the threat or the use of force in inter-
national relations; juridical equality of states, international cooperation for de-
velopment, and the struggle for international peace and security.”87
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Mexico, a relatively weak state next to a very strong one that had routinely
intervened in its affairs, hoped that a system of international law based on the
principles of nonintervention and juridical equality could become a way for
weak states to defend their interests, and thereby to balance the overwhelming
power of the United States. Mexican Foreign Secretary Genaro Estrada in 1930
extended the goal from nonintervention to noninterference by declaring that
Mexico would no longer recognize or make judgments about the nature of for-
eign governments, whether they come to power legally or extralegally.88 The
“Estrada Doctrine” or “Mexico Doctrine” was invoked by other countries fol-
lowing the model, which acknowledged that diplomatic representatives are
accredited to the state and not to the government.
Working cooperatively, Argentina and Mexico managed by the 1930s to
realize one of soft balancing’s most signiªcant diplomatic achievements: per-
suading the United States to formally abjure intervention. At a 1928 inter-
American conference held in Havana, the Argentine delegation led broad
Latin American demands for a general agreement against intervention in
light of three decades of U.S. Marine landings in Central America and the
Caribbean. The head of the Argentine delegation, Honorio Pueyrredón,
strongly denounced U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, reafªrmed Argentina’s
“unbreakable conviction” on nonintervention, then stalked out of the confer-
ence when U.S. delegate Charles Evans Hughes refused to discuss the issue.
Mexico seconded the Argentines, and El Salvador, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Haiti, Guatemala, and Colombia followed.89 Even “puppet” dictators
in several of those countries turned out to have a degree of autonomy in for-
eign policy, and many used it to seek to delegitimize U.S. military intervention
in the region.
The about-face that became the heart of Franklin Roosevelt’s Good
Neighbor policy began under Roosevelt’s predecessor, Herbert Hoover. As
president-elect in late 1928, Hoover went on a ten-week tour of Latin America,
where he was startled at the level of criticism he encountered, from demon-
strations to challenges from government ofªcials. President Hipólito Yrigoyen
of Argentina was most direct. At a banquet for Hoover, Yrigoyen called for the
American states to become “entities reigned by ethical norms so lofty that their
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power cannot be a danger to justice, nor a shadow projected upon the sover-
eignty of the other states.” In a private meeting, the Argentine president star-
tled Hoover into a brief silence by stating that U.S. intervention on behalf of its
citizens’ claims had rendered U.S. investment hazardous to national sover-
eignty.90 During this trip Hoover impressed Latin American ofªcials by show-
ing, as an Argentine diplomat put it, “a lively interest in learning the reasons
for this antipathy toward the United States—an interest based in the desire to
remove the causes that motivate it.”91 A few weeks after taking ofªce, Hoover
gave an address stating that “it never has been and ought not to be the policy
of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts be-
tween our citizens and foreign States or their citizens.”92 This announcement
made Hoover the ªrst U.S. president to accept the Argentine doctrines of
Calvo and Drago. He then withdrew the Marines from occupation duty in
Nicaragua, where their war against rebels, led by Augusto Sandino, had long
hurt the U.S. image throughout the region.
Hoover’s receptiveness to Latin American views was an essential element in
the change to U.S. policy. A different president might not have been as respon-
sive to pressure from Latin America. That pressure was another decisive ele-
ment, however.93 Hoover’s secretary of state, Henry Stimson, observed in a
1931 radio broadcast that “sore spots” in U.S.-Latin American relations “have
damaged our good name, our credit, and our trade far beyond the apprehen-
sion of our own people,” and claimed progress in the U.S. effort “to eradicate
the sore spots of Latin-American diplomacy.”94 Mexican diplomats similarly
believed that Latin American public opinion and “declarations of an ofªcial
character, such as those produced in Mexico recently,” had caused these
changes in “the conduct of the international policy of the United States.”95
Franklin Roosevelt went further than his predecessor in seeking an end to
the long tradition of unbridled intervention. He withdrew the Marines from
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He terminated the Platt amendment,
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forced upon Cuba in 1901 to codify a U.S. right to unilateral intervention at
will in that country. Roosevelt even ordered his diplomats in Latin America to
follow the principle of the Mexican Estrada Doctrine: the State Department re-
linquished the use of nonrecognition to sanction regimes that came to power
through force, and its ofªcers declined even to offer comment or advise on do-
mestic questions in Latin American countries. U.S. policy had gone in a few
short decades from defending military intervention to abjuring not only inter-
vention but interference in the internal affairs of Latin American states.
The context of the global Depression meant that the direct costs of station-
ing military forces abroad loomed large, and the political costs at home and
internationally seemed to outweigh the beneªts. Armed insurgencies in the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua also inºicted pain that contributed
importantly to the U.S. withdrawal.96 So did anti-imperialist and nongovern-
mental peace organizations in the United States and Latin America. The extent
of international popular pressure was reºected, for example, in the million sig-
natures from citizens of the Americas collected by a transnational feminist
peace group to deliver to the delegates at the 1936 conference in Buenos
Aires.97 A transformation as signiªcant as the U.S. shift from frequent inter-
vention to nonintervention in Latin America was thus necessarily the product
of multicausality. Beyond changes in the personnel of U.S. administrations, a
departure from the tradition of interventionism was made possible in part be-
cause of the extent to which much of Latin America was ruled by men gener-
ally willing to go along with the strategic goals and fundamental demands of
the United States. Most countries in Central America and the Caribbean were
by Franklin Roosevelt’s time ªrmly in the hands of a collection of dictators
whose rigorous suppression of popular movements and abstention from forms
of economic nationalism that might threaten U.S. investments seemed to make
U.S. troops superºuous. The dictators were capable of exercising autonomy
within the framework of U.S. predominance, and caudillos (strongmen) such as
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua
did not cooperate with every request from the State Department. Support for
dictatorship and military rule made it easier, however, for the United States to
behave in a more “neighborly” fashion while still achieving its principal goals.
Too little attention has been given to yet another factor: the decades of
steady pressure from Latin American countries, led by Argentina and joined
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by Mexico, to adopt new norms of international behavior.98 This often took
place within the mechanism of the Pan-American conferences organized every
few years at the ministerial level, initially at U.S. request. The inter-American
system is a good example both of Paul’s recent observation that soft balanc-
ing often includes “collaboration in regional or international institutions,”
and Josef Joffe’s remark apropos of disputes of the 1990s that “[g]reat powers
loathe international institutions they cannot dominate; lesser nations like them
the way the Lilliputians liked their ropes on Gulliver.”99
The United States’ ambivalence toward the Pan-American system it had cre-
ated after its domination had weakened preªgured twenty-ªrst-century U.S.
impatience with the United Nations it helped create after it could no longer
dominate that institution. And just as the French, German, and Russian oppo-
sition to the George W. Bush administration at the United Nations in 2002–03
focused not on forestalling any aggressive moves aimed at their own territory
but at the planned invasion of Iraq, the Argentine and Mexican opposition to
U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean was not strictly a de-
fensive response to a threat to their own territory, but represented a broader
and more long-range desire to reduce the potential for future U.S. military in-
terventions in the entire region. As Pape put it, “Concerns over indirect threats
are likely to be greater in unipolar systems than in other balance of power sys-
tems. . . . Hence, other states may have reason to oppose military action by a
unipolar leader, even if it has no intention of harming them directly.”100 Paul
argues that soft balancing tends to occur when the unipole’s “power position
and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious
challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers” and when “the dominant
state cannot easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts of others are
not overt or because they do not directly challenge its power position with
military means.”101 Although Mexico was still smarting from the injuries to
its overeignty, these conditions ªt Latin American diplomatic history in
this period.
In the lead-up to the 1933 conference at Montevideo, Mexican expectations
were initially low. The prospect of an accord on nonintervention seemed un-
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likely, according to career diplomat Fernando González Roa, because “the
United States cannot get anything from us nor can we get anything from
them.”102 But Argentina pressed forward, and Mexico decided to try to coordi-
nate a joint offensive. Mexico’s foreign secretary, J.M. Puig Casauranc, wrote to
his Argentine counterpart, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, that together they could
achieve at Montevideo what had long been on their respective agendas. “My
ambition is that in Montevideo we completely destroy the thesis of Colonel
Porter,” Puig wrote, “and bring to discussion at the VII Conference, in all of
its pristine purity, the Drago Doctrine. If we achieve the acceptance of this
Doctrine and its juridical translation into a Pan-American convention, the
threat that has always hovered over almost all of the countries of Latin
America will disappear.”103 Saavedra Lamas replied that he welcomed the
Mexican leadership role in pursuing “the common ideals that for long years
have inspired our country and the noble Mexican Republic.”104 Mexican mem-
bers of the program committee got the intervention issue put back on the
agenda, and thwarted a proposal emerging from the American Institute of
International Law that would have included an exception permitting interven-
tion in necessary cases.105 Puig’s diplomats fanned out across the region, obtain-
ing supportive responses to his proposal to replace the Monroe Doctrine with a
continent-wide assertion of the principle of nonintervention along the lines of
the original Drago Doctrine. “¡Magníªco! ¡Maravilloso!” cried the Colombian
foreign minister, Roberto Urdaneta Arbeláez, upon hearing the proposal.106
To manage the unpredictable Foreign Minister Juan Guzmán Cruchaga of
Chile and the often prickly and proud Foreign Minister Saavedra Lamas
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of Argentina, Puig turned to Mexican essayist and diplomat Alfonso Reyes—
whom Jorge Luís Borges called the greatest prose stylist in the Spanish
language—to take on a special mission to discreetly win their approval.107
After getting both on board, Puig let other chancelleries know of Argentine
and Chilean backing, which led to unanimous support for a nonintervention
resolution even before the meeting began.108 In the end, the resolution put for-
ward at Montevideo brought together the Drago Doctrine and the Carranza
Doctrine, since Carranza in 1918 had asserted that “no country should inter-
vene in any form or for any reason in the internal affairs of another.”109 At
Montevideo, conferees resolved that “no state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another.” Importantly, Secretary of State Cordell
Hull signed the resolution but presented reservations, arguing that interven-
tion was not deªned, so the United States would continue to pursue its
own policy.
Hull’s reservations led Mexico and Argentina to renew their efforts to get an
unqualiªed resolution passed at the next inter-American meeting, held in
Buenos Aires in 1936. There was no need, wrote Carranza’s former foreign sec-
retary Isidro Fabela, now an adviser to the ministry, to “turn Mexico into a
Quijote country that seizes any opportunity to challenge the political wrongs
committed by North America against our Republics of the South,” especially
since Mexico lacked the power on its own to become the protector of the op-
pressed. Mexico, however, did have “a noble and transcendent mission” to
continue an independent foreign policy and to express its ideas freely.110 By
now, the rise of the fascist powers in Europe and a German trade offensive in
Latin America motivated the United States to improve cooperation with Latin
American countries. This time, with President Roosevelt himself in attendance,
the Latin American diplomats were successful, gaining unanimous agreement
to an unqualiªed resolution prohibiting intervention “directly or indirectly,
and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of the parties.”111 In
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what came to be called the Good Neighbor policy, the United States was en-
dorsing what the Argentines and then the Mexicans had pushed for decades.
Conclusion
Was a diplomatic resolution—a scrap of paper—an achievement of soft bal-
ancing? Taking into account the various structural, economic, and political
factors that went into the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to the Good
Neighbor policy, the long campaign to get nonintervention adopted as a norm
in the inter-American system—to balance U.S. hard power with the softer tools
of diplomacy and international law through cooperation in multinational
institutions—must be seen as a part of that achievement. It is a good example
of Robert Art’s distinction between policy bargaining, “the attempt to produce
favorable outcomes with current assets,” versus balancing behavior, “the at-
tempt to augment assets so as to produce better outcomes the next time. . . .
[B]alancing is as much about preserving a state’s autonomy, independence,
and ability to inºuence international outcomes vis-à-vis a powerful state or
group of states as it is about dealing with threats of direct attack from them.”
Latin American states had achieved these improvements using what Art calls
“soft assets”—informal alignments and international organizations.112 And
they had done so “by assembling countervailing coalitions designed to thwart
or impede speciªc policies,” in a process that “accepts the current balance of
power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it,” in Stephen Walt’s
deªnition of soft balancing.113
The erosion of the Good Neighbor policy began during World War II, with
deep interference in the internal affairs of many countries in the form of U.S.
pressure for them to deport their German and Japanese residents; continued
with nonrecognition of governments that came to power in Argentina and
Bolivia; and culminated in Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs
Spruille Braden’s highly publicized crusade to bring down the government of
Argentina (whose principal effect was to rally Argentines behind Juan
Domingo Perón).114 In the 1950s, the United States shifted from an earlier
tradition of direct military intervention to covert and proxy interventions in
the cases of Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Guyana (1961–64), Chile (1970–
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73), and Nicaragua (1981–90), as well as outright military invasions of the
Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989).
To see those forms of intervention as the absence of soft balancing would be
to argue that strategy does not exist unless it is consistently and permanently
effective. Moreover, each of those Cold War–era interventions produced wide-
spread opposition that reminded U.S. policymakers that military action in
Latin America brought costs to prestige, which may have helped ensure that
even the direct military invasions were not followed by the kind of lengthy oc-
cupations common in the pre-1936 era. The shift from overt to covert interven-
tion was itself a reºection of the diminished international tolerance, especially
in Latin America, for military invasions and extended occupations. Robert
Pape used the term “soft balancing” to describe a loose international coalition
of states that sought to dissuade the United States from invading Iraq in
2003.115 That the United States went ahead with its invasion does not mean
that the balancing effort did not occur, nor does it mean analysts should ignore
the constraints that became evident in the diminished appetite for U.S.
military action on a similar scale thereafter. The United States has not inter-
vened in the twenty-ªrst century to cause regime change in Bolivia, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Venezuela,116 despite the advent of leftist govern-
ments in those countries, which does suggest that changed international
norms are contributing to constraints on what was once an American preroga-
tive. The Barack Obama administration’s late 2014 decision to restore diplo-
matic relations with Cuba and weaken the half-century-old embargo against
that country was in part a recognition that continuing U.S. infringement of
Cuban sovereignty had become a major obstacle to improved relations with
the region. It also appeared to be a response to the soft balancing engaged in
by Latin American states, especially South American middle powers, which
had created multinational institutions excluding the United States such as the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States, and had strongly criticized the continuing
U.S. embargo of Cuba at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in 2012 and
threatened to do so at the 2015 Summit in Panama. In a departure from its tra-
ditionally cooperative role, Brazil, now with the world’s seventh-largest econ-
omy, has become one of the leaders of twenty-ªrst-century soft balancing,
anchoring UNASUR and promoting nonviolent settlements of U.S. confronta-
tions not only with Latin American states such as Cuba and Venezuela but
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in the U.S.-Iranian nuclear dispute.117 The rise of numerous leftist govern-
ments of various stripes whose survival would have been improbable in an-
other era may well owe something to the long-term change in international
norms that Latin American soft balancing helped to achieve—even as the
violent aftermath of proxy interventions and counterinsurgency manifests it-
self in drug wars and unprecedented levels of urban crime in many countries
in the region.
Scholarly arguments over soft balancing have focused largely on whether it
is happening, and if so, whether it might lead to an erosion of U.S. power or
even presages the formation of dangerous hard balancing against the United
States. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth ªnd “no evidence to support
the expectation that the coordinated actions of other major powers will com-
pel the United States to be restrained. Instead, the case for restraint will hinge
on convincing U.S. foreign policy makers that it serves the United States’ long-
term interest.”118 Of course, one of the ways U.S. policymakers have been
moved toward restraint in the past is when they recognize that the costs of mil-
itary intervention are rising. Whether we are discussing Marine occupations in
the Caribbean or military interventions in Vietnam or Iraq, this calculation
includes reputational costs driven home by sustained opposition abroad. As
Secretary of State Stimson noted, the United States had indeed paid a price for
its actions in Latin America, and reaped rewards from changing course. Ac-
cording to T.V. Paul, if “the hegemonic power in response to soft balancing ef-
forts tempers its aggressive behavior, then one can deduce that the efforts by
second-tier major power states partially succeeded.”119 It may be too soon to
know whether the Obama administration’s tempering of the U.S. role in the
Middle East is such a case. The experience of Latin America’s relatively suc-
cessful soft-balancing effort—followed by the immediate beneªts to the United
States of the Good Neighbor policy in the form of widespread solidarity
during World War II and the evolution of a hemisphere in which U.S. interests
are largely secure—suggests that the emergence of constraints on the use
of U.S. military power through the development of international law and
the strengthening of international institutions need not threaten the United
States, even when those changes are initiated by states seeking to balance
U.S. predominance.
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Appendix. Timeline
1868 Calvo Doctrine (Argentina) proposes end to extraterritorial rights
for investors
1889 First Pan-American Conference: United States proposes customs
union, thwarted by Argentina
1895 United States asserts its “ªat is law” in Latin America under
Olney Doctrine
1898 United States defeats Spain in war; takes control of Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Philippines
1901 United States imposes interventionist Platt amendment on Cuba
1902–03 Second Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes
Calvo Doctrine
1902–03 Germany, Great Britain, Italy send gunboats to Venezuela to
collect debt
1903 Drago Doctrine (Argentina) calls for prohibition on force to
collect debts
1903 U.S. aids Panamanian revolutionaries, acquires Canal Zone
1904 Roosevelt Corollary (U.S.) asserts unilateral interventionist right
1905 U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic
1906 U.S. intervention in Cuba
1906 Third Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes Drago
Doctrine, thwarted by United States
1907 Second Hague Peace Conference: Argentina proposes Drago
Doctrine, United States amends into weaker Porter Doctrine
1909 U.S. intervention in Nicaragua
1910–17 Mexican Revolution
1912 United States occupies Nicaragua
1914 United States occupies Veracruz; Argentina, Brazil, Chile
mediate withdrawal
1915 United States occupies Haiti
1916 United States occupies Dominican Republic
1916 U.S. troops pursue Pancho Villa in northern Mexico
1918 Carranza Doctrine (Mexico) calls for nonintervention in
any circumstance
1928 Sixth Pan-American Conference: Argentina proposes
nonintervention pact, seconded by Mexico; United States rejects
1928 Herbert Hoover elected, listening tour of South America
1930 Estrada Doctrine (Mexico) calls for recognition of
de facto governments
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1933 Franklin Roosevelt announces Good Neighbor Policy
1933 Mexico and Argentina push nonintervention on inter-American
agenda, combining Drago and Carranza Doctrines
1933 Seventh Pan-American Conference: U.S. signs nonintervention
pact with reservations
1936 U.S. State Department orders policy comparable to
Estrada Doctrine
1936 Mexico and Argentina push unqualiªed nonintervention
resolution on inter-American agenda
1936 Eighth Pan-American Conference: U.S. signs non-intervention pact
without reservations
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